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THE FIRST BANKING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE CRISIS?
Carla Gabriela Alsina Nivar*
ABSTRACT
In 2003, the Dominican Republic suffered the failure of three of the
country's largest banks; it was a costly banking crisis that had tremendous
economic and social repercussions.
Under the premise of the Dominican banking crisis, the issue of bank-
ing corporate governance becomes important because banks are not ordi-
nary corporations. The failure of a bank negatively affects a vast range of
stakeholders, which include: shareholders, depositors, creditors, employ-
ees, taxpayers, and the public interest represented by the regulator. In
fact, the agency problem is identified as the cause of recent banking cri-
ses. Thus, the interests of the stakeholders become crucial in taming the
information asymmetries that cause this problem. Therefore, a broad ap-
proach to banking corporate governance is a necessary step in the pre-
vention of future banking crises; an approach that takes into account the
broad array of stakeholders, instead of the traditional shareholder-man-
agement relationship. This in turn, changes the roles of stakeholders and
the dual role that must be assumed by the regulator as an agent of the
public interest.
Based on the above, the current Dominican regulatory framework is
analyzed to determine if it takes into account the broad base of stake-
holders as a means to prevent the information asymmetries that cause the
agency problem. This analysis is based on the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) standards of corporate govern-
ance as the predominant trend in corporate governance standards, con-
cluding that different aspects of the law take into account stakeholder
interests. But the regulator is only granted supervisory power and is una-
ble to effectively act as agent for some of the stakeholders.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Leaving aside war, banking crises in developing countries, in general,
and in Latin America, in particular, may stand as the major man-
made catastrophe in recent history. The destruction of real and fi-
nancial wealth that systemic banking crises entail is so large that
there is little wonder that financial intermediation in Latin American
remains shallow and well below the levels reached by industrial
countries. Among developing countries, Latin American stands out
for the frequency, depth and costs of its banking crises.'
HE 2003 Dominican banking crisis was no exception to this sad
account of banking failures in Latin America, including a rescue
by the Central Bank of 25 percent of the country's gross domestic
product (GDP), a cost that Dominicans could ill afford. 2 The broad
scope of victims touched by the crisis evidences that the consequences
were not only economic, but had a strong social dimension as well. These
consequences are also evidence that banks are not ordinary corporations.
Their very nature is tied to vast sectors of society, and accordingly, the
authorities have taken a keen interest in regulating the market. 3 There-
fore, since bank failures affect a broad range of stakeholders, so must the
corporate governance mechanisms installed to control risk in financial
intermediaries.
Hence, after the bank crisis, "prevention is the best cure . . .a good
cure goes a long way in preventing recurrence. '' 4 Nevertheless, preven-
tion can only work if the right tools are put into place, which means the
banking corporate governance system in the Dominican Republic must
protect the interests of the different stakeholders in relation to financial
intermediaries.
In this respect, the forthcoming paper will proceed as follows: Section
II, a description of the 2003 Dominican banking crisis with the purpose of
highlighting the social and economic costs of the failure of three of the
main banks in the country. Section III defines corporate governance as
an important part of the internal functioning of the banks, defines and
establishes the agency problem among stakeholders as the main cause of
recent banking crises, and proves that it is appropriate to adopt a broad
1. Liliana Rojas-Suarez, Banking Crises in Latin America: Can Recurrence be Pre-
vented? 1 (Mar. 2002) (paper on banking supervision presented at the World Bank
Conference, Montevideo, 2002), available at http://www.claaf.org/documents/
RojasSuarez2.doc.
2. JosE FLORENCIO GUZMAN ET AL., INFORME DEL PANEL EXPERTOS INTERNACION-
ALES: CRISIS BANCARIA REPUBLICA DOMINICANA 12 (Banco Central de la Repub-
lica Dominicana, rev. Mar. 2005), available at http://www.bancentral.gov.do/FMI/
informecb.pdf.
3. Kern Alexander, Corporate Governance and Banking Regulation: The Regulator as
Stakeholder 6 (Cambridge Endowment for Research in Fin. Research Programme
in Int'l Fin. Regulation, Working Paper No. 17, 2004), available at http://www.cerf.
cam.ac.uk/publications/files/WP17%20-%20Alexanderl .pdf.
4. Rojas-Suarez, supra note 1, at 2.
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approach to banking corporate governance. Finally, Section IV evaluates
the Dominican banking corporate governance regime in light of the stan-
dards set by the OECD and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion (Basel Committee) as the current trend in corporate governance
standards.
In conclusion, there is a strong need for the broad scope of stakehold-
ers of financial intermediaries to participate in order to curtail manage-
ment's tendency for excessive risk taking. This balance of interests
prevents information asymmetries that cause the agency problem, and
thus, aides in the effort to prevent future banking crises. Therefore, the
Dominican banking crisis is the first corporate governance crisis, as it is
an example of the need for a change and the recognition that a revolution
of corporate governance is necessary in order to broaden the stakeholder
spectrum and to include the important interests that will monitor and pre-
serve the health of financial intermediaries.
II. DOMINICAN BANKING CRISIS
On March 13, 2003, the former governor of the Central Bank of the
Dominican Republic gave a speech from the presidential palace announc-
ing the financial collapse and breakdown of one of the largest commercial
private banks in the entire country. He announced that Banco Intercon-
tinental (Baninter) had been the victim of a horrendous fraud by some of
its major executives and it now had a deficit of 55 billion Dominican pe-
sos. 5 He reassured the depositors of Baninter that their investments
would be accounted for by the government. Not long after, two other
large commercial private banks followed, and after more than three
years, many uncertainties remain as the story of these events continues to
unfold.
Baninter, Banco Nacional de Credito (Bancredito), and Banco Mer-
cantil had gained the trust and investment of the Dominican people and
became three of the largest banks in the country. Consequently, after the
discovery of the frauds and due to the fact that these banks had the ma-
jority of the assets in the system, the authorities feared the outbreak of a
systemic crisis.6 It was under these circumstances that the authorities
turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in order to re-capital-
ize the Central Bank.
A. BANINTER
Baninter was the third largest bank in the Dominican Republic with
official assets ascending to 26 billion Dominican pesos.7 Its path towards
growth began in October 1996 when it acquired Banco del Comercio, a
5. Padre Jorge Cela, Implicaciones Eticas y Culturales del Tema de la Corrupci6n,
PARTICIPACION CIUDADANA (Dom. Rep.), June 2, 2003, http://www.pciudadana.
com/noticias/not_2003/06022003_discurso-jorge-cela.htm.
6. GUZMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 9.
7. Id. at 13.
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bank that had collapsed due to a bank run supposedly initiated by a ru-
mor spread by a disloyal competitor. 8
After a period of rapid growth, Baninter had become the third largest
bank in the country. But in 2003, it was plagued with an immense liquid-
ity crisis and had gone over its limit in the drafting facilities provided by
the reserve of the Central Bank. 9 By 2003, the Central Bank had lent
Baninter one and a half times the amount of its declared patrimony, sur-
passing the limits established by the cap on this sort of lending. 10 Thus, a
sale of the bank to Banco del Progreso was negotiated.1
Nevertheless, during the due diligence phase of the negotiations for the
sale of the bank, a parallel bank was uncovered where many operations
were kept off the official balance sheet. The calculations project that
these hidden assets were twice as much as the official bank's reported
operations, making Baninter the first ranking bank in terms of assets in
the Dominican Republic with a sum of 81 billion Dominican pesos.12 As
expected, Banco del Progreso terminated the purchase negotiations and
the authorities proceeded to seize Baninter and designate a committee to
handle its liquidation, selling part of the branches to Scotia Bank along
with some of the credit portfolio.1 3
According to the ex-governor of the Central Bank, a report from an
International Panel of Experts designated by the IMF and the Dominican
government, the specific mechanism that had been used to conceal the
fraud was a parallel bank or parallel accounting. They used software to
cover up part of the bank's operations from authorities and from the gen-
eral public in order to reduce costs, evade the payment of taxes, gain
market competitiveness, and provide loans to parties related to company
officials who stand accused today.14
Nonetheless, the president of Baninter claims that both the technologi-
cal and physical platforms of the bank were acquired from the Central
Bank in 1996 when Baninter purchased Banco del Comercio, which in-
cluded an offshore bank.15 In fact, he argues that the authorities knew of
the true size of the bank, based on the fact that the purchase agreement
between Baninter's shareholders and Banco del Progreso contained an
appendix that revealed the bank's assets were worth over 80 billion Do-
8. La Verdad Sobre Baninter, SEGUNDA ENTREGA: Banco Central Indujo a
Baninter Para Que Comprara Quebrados, http://diariohorizonte.com/CSblogs/la-
verdadsobrebaninter/archive/2006/05/04/40.aspx (May 4, 2006, 7:00 AM).
9. GUZMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 28.
10. Id. at 29.
11. La Verdad Sobre Baninter, PLAN MEJIA 1: Gobernador BC Presion6 Para
Vender el Baninter, http://diariohorizonte.com/CS/blogs/la-verdad-sobre_
baninter/archive/2006/05/15/49.aspx (May 15, 2006, 6:47 AM).
12. GUZMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 13.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 12-13.
15. La Verdad Sobre Baninter, PLAN MEJIA II: Los Activos del Baninter Superaban
RD$80,000 MM, http://diariohorizonte.com/CS/blogs/la-verdadsobre-baninter/
archive/2006/05/16/50.aspx (May 16, 2006, 6:50 AM).
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minican pesos. 16 He sustains that it is impossible for the authorities to
claim there is a parallel bank, as they officially certified the purchase
agreement. 17
Moreover, the International Panel report states that in addition to the
parallel banks, offshore banks were encountered and considered to exist
parallel to the official bank, as they were also kept off the official balance
sheet.18 This situation prevented the true nature of the entity from being
recognized, as well as a true assessment of the risks from being made.
The bottom line was that the depositors did not know where their money
was going.
B. BANCREDITO
"Since the banking industry is inherently unstable, the authorities al-
ways need to be prepared to confront the possibility of crises or
problems." 19 Thus, the liquidity crisis and subsequent intervention into
Baninter, one of the largest banks in the Dominican financial system, led
to tension in the functioning of other banks. This situation as a whole led
to the liquidity problems of two more bank entities: Bancredito and
Banco Mercantil.20
With an already frail market and the uncovering of similar parallel ac-
counting maneuvers as well as offshore facilities, Bancredito was facing a
serious liquidity crisis. Public panic provoked an intense bank run on
Bancredito. The Central Bank released resources from its reserve in or-
der to cover the depositors' investments that were being retrieved from
Bancredito's vaults. According to the International Panel, Bancredito
had "non-registered operations similar to those run by Baninter, ''21 with
an unaccounted sum of 23 billion Dominican pesos.22
Faced with the difficulties and lack of resources after Baninter's down-
fall and with a general feeling of distrust from the public, the authorities
transferred control of Bancredito to Grupo Leon instead of proceeding
with another intervention. In return, the Central Bank offered Grupo
Leon liquidity guarantees as well as the acquisition (in part) of the weak-
est portfolio and operations of Bancredito. 23 Furthermore, the authori-
ties obtained assets from the former shareholders of Bancredito as well as
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. GUZMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 13.
19. Rosa Maria Lastra, Cross-Border Bank Insolvency: Legal Implications in the Case
of Banks Operating in Different Jurisdictions in Latin America, 6 J. INT'L ECON. L.
79, 80 (2003).
20. GUZMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 10-11.
21. Id. (translated by the author).
22. Edith Febles, Por Estafa a los Ahorristas y al Estado: Condenan a Arturo Pellerano
y Felipe Mendoza a 3 Ahos de Cdrcel y al Pago de RD$] mill6n, Cada Uno, CLAVE
DIGITAL (Dom. Rep.), Aug. 10, 2006, http://www.clavedigital.com/Portada/Ar-
ticulo.asp?Id_Articulo=7976.
23. GUZMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 11.
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from the companies linked with the bank.2 4
On August 9, 2006, three years later, the courts sentenced Bancredito's
president and another top executive to three years of prison and the pay-
ment of 1 million Dominican pesos each.25 They were convicted of elabo-
rating and using false bank documents, altering and manipulating
information and documents with the purpose of deviating the supervision
and investigations conducted by the financial authorities, as well as alter-
ing and approving adulterated financial statements with the purpose of
concealing operations. 26 This sentence is currently pending appeal by the
convicted parties.2 7
C. BANCO MERCANTIL
After what occurred with Baninter and the fear caused by the situation
of Bancredito, the authorities recognized the importance of disclosure
and requested affidavits from the shareholders and managers of the re-
maining banks declaring that they were unaware of off-the-books opera-
tions in their respective institutions. All the banks submitted the
requested affidavits except Banco Mercantil. This refusal by Banco Mer-
cantil led to an inspection of the bank where minor irregularities were
encountered and where the need for capitalization was evident.28
Consequently, Banco Mercantil was sold to The Republic Bank of Trin-
idad and Tobago, with the Central Bank assuming liquidity guarantees
and acquiring part of the troublesome portfolio. 29
D. A BANKING CRISIS: BANINTER, BANCREDITO, BANCO MERCANTIL
According to George Kaufman, Finance and Economics Professor at
Loyola University in Chicago as well as a consultant to the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Chicago, "[a] bank fails economically when the market
value of its assets declines below the market value of its liabilities, so that
the market value of its capital (net worth) becomes negative. ' 30 In the
case of the 2003 Dominican banking crisis, in the weeks preceding the
announcement by the governor, constant rumors of illiquidity plagued
Baninter, which in turn provoked bank runs.31 A bank run occurs when,
due to the spread of rumors of a bank run, its depositors go "to withdraw
their funds, but depositors at other banks, not subject to the same bad
news, may also run on their banks as bank runs are frequently viewed as
24. Id.
25. Febles, supra note 22.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. GUZMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 11-12.
29. Id.
30. George G. Kaufman, Bank Failures, Systemic Risk, and Bank Regulation, 16 CATO
J. 17, 19 (1996), available at http://cato.org/pubs/journal/cjl6nl/cjl6nl-2.pdf.
31. Juan De La Cruz, Ahorrantes Reciben Dinero en Sucursales de Baninter, EL DfA
(Dom. Rep.), Apr. 11, 2003, at 10.
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contagious. '32
The causes of the Dominican banking crisis appear to have been devel-
oping over time, but were triggered by the collapse of Baninter, which
spread to two other large banks in the system: Bancredito and Banco
Mercantil. The use of parallel banks, special accounting methods, and
offshore banks, gave these seemingly healthy institutions places to hide
assets and conceal the real risk exponents of their transactions. Evi-
dently, the general public had no idea how their money was being
handled.
In retrospect, the resources used for this massive rescue operation
amount to approximately 25 percent of the country's GDP.33 Moreover,
according to The Economist, the Dominican Republic "was one of the
Caribbean's success stories of the 1990s" but was robbed of this distinc-
tion in four years by the 2003 banking crisis. 34
But the worst consequences were the losses incurred by many stake-
holders who have yet to be repaid, as well as the banks' employees who
lost their jobs. Therefore, it is clear that there is a large range of stake-
holders in the bank sector. This is evidenced by simply appreciating the
amount of people affected by the Dominican banking crisis: shareholders,
depositors, creditors, employees, market competitors, taxpayers, and so-
ciety as a whole. All of these stakeholders need to be recognized in order
to effectively represent their interests and control management from ex-
cessive risk taking in the prevention of future banking crises.
III. BANKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND BANKING
There is a general consensus that the failure of a financial firm is more
severe than the failure of a non-financial firm.35 This is because "[u]nlike
firms in the nonfinancial sector, a mismanaged bank may lead to a bank
32. George G. Kaufman, Bank Runs: Causes, Benefits, and Costs, 7 CATO J. 559, 559
(1988), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj7n3/cj7n3-2.pdf.
33. GUZMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 12.
34. The Dominican Republic's Economic Recovery: A Cure but not yet a Miracle, THE
ECONOMIST, May 28, 2005, at 5.
35. See generally Ren6e Adams & Hamid Mehran, Is Corporate Governance Different
for Bank Holding Companies?, 9 FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL'Y REV. 123
(2003) available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/03vO9nl/
0304adam.pdf; Kern Alexander, UK Corporate Governance and Banking Regula-
tion: The Regulator's Role as Stakeholder, 33 STETSON L. REV. 991 (2004); Kern
Alexander & Rahul Dhumale, Enhancing Corporate Governance for Financial In-
stitutions: The Role of International Standards (ESRC Centre for Bus. Research,
Univ. of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 196, 2001), available at http://
www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/wp196.pdf; T.G. Arun & J.D. Turner, Corporate Govern-
ance of Banks in Developing Economies: Concepts and Issues, 12 CORP. GOVERN-
ANCE: AN INT'L REV. 371 (2004); JAMES R. BARTH, GERALD CAPRIO, JR. & Ross
LEVINE, RETHINKING BANK REGULATION: TILL ANGELS GOVERN (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2006); Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, The Corporate Govern-
ance of Banks, 19 FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL'Y REV. 91 (2003), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/03vO9nl/0304mace.pdf.
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run or a collapse."' 36 Thus, the health of the entire economy depends on
the effective performance of banks.37 An example of this phenomenon
was the above described banking crisis, where the collapse of one bank
brought down two more and de-capitalized the Central Bank.38
In addition, banks: in developing economies have a dominant position
in the development of the financial system and economic growth, as well
as being the main source of finance and holder of the economy's sav-
ings.39 Therefore, society and the economy depend greatly on the health
of the financial intermediaries. In fact, experts such as James Barth, Ge-
rard Caprio, and Ross Levine argue that "[b]anking crises can completely
disrupt economies, and the human costs can be very real, as, for example,
when health and education programs are dramatically cut to fund a gov-
ernment bailout of the failed banks."'40 To explain this phenomenon,
Kaufman summarizes three main reasons for the fragility of banks:
(1) low capital-to-assets ratios (high leverage), which provides little
room for losses; (2) low cash-to-assets ratios (fractional reserve
banking), which may require the sale of earning assets to meet de-
posit obligations: and (3) high demand debt and short-term debt-to-
total debt (deposits) ratios (high potential for a run), which may re-
quire hurried asset sales of opaque and non-liquid earning assets
with potentially large fire-sale losses to pay off running depositors. 41
In sum, because of the inherent instability of the financial markets, the
government needs to intervene in order to provide protection to the dif-
ferent stakeholders, 42 especially in the prevention of agency problems.
B. THE AGENCY PROBLEM: MAIN CAUSE OF BANKING CRISES
Studies have shown that the main causes of recent banking crises have
been agency problems because "[m]anagement may have different risk
preferences from those of other stakeholders including the government,
owners, creditors, etc., or limited competence in assessing the risks in-
volved in its decisions. '43 The agency problem or principle-agent prob-
lem is based on the presumption "that managers have an information
advantage and that this gives them the opportunity to take self-interested
actions," 44 where "[b]oth the principle and the agent are assumed to be
36. Alexander, UK Corporate Governance and Banking Regulation: The Regulator's
Role as Stakeholder, supra note 35, at 992.
37. Adams & Mehran, supra note 35, at 124.
38. Steve H. Hanke, The Dominican Republic: Resolving the Banking Crisis and Re-
storing Growth, CATO INST. FOREIGN POLICY BRIEFING No. 83, July 20, 2004,
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb83.pdf.
39. Arun & Turner, supra note 35, at 371.
40. BARTH, CAPRIO & LEVINE, supra note 35, at 2.
41. Kaufman, Bank Failures, Systemic Risk, and Bank Regulation, supra note 32.
42. See generally Alexander & Dhumale, supra note 35, at 4-5.
43. Id. at 6.
44. Alexander, UK Corporate Governance and Banking Regulation: The Regulator's
Role as Stakeholder, supra note 35, at 1007 (citing Joseph E. Stiglitz, Principal and
Agent, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: ALLOCATION, INFORMATION AND MARKETS 241,
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utility maximizers and will endeavor to pursue their own respective
objectives. '45
Consequently, these information asymmetries prevent proper control
over the corporation by these various groups of stakeholders. Thus,
"[a]dequate corporate governance structures for banking institutions re-
quire internal control systems within banks to address the inherent asym-
metries of information and the potential market failure that may
result."'46 This in turn, will enhance the position of stakeholders to con-
trol excessive risk-taking by management.
The existence of so many interested parties causes the various types of
agency problems that may occur with respect to one intermediary entity.
In their book, Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till Angels Govern, Barth,
Caprio, and Levine construct an institutional environment with various
manifestations of the principal-agent problem, stating that "informational
asymmetries make it difficult for the market - depositors, equity holders,
other creditors, and rating agencies - to monitor and control bank man-
agers."'47 So, it is evident that in the financial industry there are several
different types of stakeholders that have interests in the governance of
the bank firm. Additionally, we have established that due to "the
broader risk that banks and financial firms pose to the economy" the reg-
ulator has to intervene to protect some of the stakeholders.48
Likewise, experts agree on the fact "that transparency of information is
integrally related to accountability in that it could provide government
supervisors, bank owners, creditors, and other market participants suffi-
cient information and incentive to assess the management of a bank. '49
Thus, prevention of information asymmetries and the participation of the
market are key elements to the prevention of banking crises. This situa-
tion highlights the importance of disclosure in this prevention strategy,
but more important is what is done with the disclosed information, and
that is determined by the participation of the different stakeholders in
policy and governance. As stakeholders are able to represent their inter-
ests, they can balance the agency problem with respect to management.
But this position requires a change from the traditional approach to cor-
porate governance.
241 (John Eatwell, Murray Milgate & Peter Newman eds., Macmillan Press Ltd.
1989)).
45. Henry L. Tosi, Luis R. Gomez-Mejia & Debra L. Moody, The Separation of Own-
ership and Control: Increasing the Responsiveness of Boards of Directors to Share-
holders' Interests?, 4 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 39, 45 (1992).
46. Alexander, UK Corporate Governance and Banking Regulation: The Regulator's
Role as Stakeholder, supra note 35, at 1010.
47. BARTH, CAPRIO & LEVINE, supra note 35, at 7.
48. Alexander, UK Corporate Governance and Banking Regulation: The Regulator's
Role as Stakeholder, supra note 35, at 992.
49. Alexander & Dhumale, supra note 35, at 2.
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C. BROAD APPROACH TO BANKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Theoretically, there are two approaches to banking regulation, the nar-
row approach and the broad approach. The first is the traditional concep-
tion that views corporate governance "as the mechanism through which
shareholders are assured that managers will act in their interests. '50 The
second is the broad approach "which views the subject as the methods by
which suppliers of finance control managers in order to ensure that their
capital cannot be expropriated and that they earn a return on their invest-
ment."'51 This approach is different in the sense that it does not focus on
the shareholder as the sole stakeholder in corporate governance, but
rather all "suppliers of finance," as referred to by other authors such as
Renee Adams and Hamid Mehran.52
In this respect, the broad approach to corporate governance for the
bank sector is key to the prevention of the agency problem that causes
bank crises because the board of directors will have to respond to more
than just shareholders and take into account other stakeholders repre-
sented by the regulator. Therefore, the principle-agent problems that will
have to be attended to in the governance of banks are various because
they are a consequence of the different interests directed towards one
bank institution.
Moreover, the special nature of the bank firm and the risk it poses to
the stability of the economy, make it necessary for the regulator to play a
different and influential role. T.G. Arun and J.D. Turner, who echo
Jonathan Macey and Maureen O'Hara, contend "that a broader view of
corporate governance should be adopted in the case of banking institu-
tions ... because of the peculiar contractual form of banking, corporate
governance mechanisms for banks should encapsulate depositors as well
as shareholders." 53
The existence of various interested parties is a direct consequence of
the very nature of the banking industry.54 Consequently, the regulator
must step in to ensure that these views are taken into account in the gov-
ernance of the company, acting in representation of the public interest.
This responsibility falls on the regulator because it "can act more effi-
ciently than most stakeholder groups to ensure the bank's adherence to
regulatory and legal responsibilities. '55
Critics to the broad approach argue that:
(1) politicians will attempt to use a powerful supervisory agency to
pressure banks to lend to politically connected firms; (2) powerful
banks will seek to "capture" bank regulators and induce regulators
50. Arun & Turner, supra note 35, at 372.
51. Id.
52. Adams & Mehran, supra note 35, at 124.
53. Arun & Turner, supra note 35, at 372.
54. See Adams & Mehran, supra note 35, at 124.
55. Alexander, UK Corporate Governance and Banking Regulation: The Regulator's
Role as Stakeholder, supra note 35, at 992.
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to act in the best interest of banks, not the interest of society at large;
and (3) political and legal institutions are generally unable to contain
these forces. 56
These critics side with the private interest view, which neglects the par-
ticipation of government in the governance of bank firms. Nevertheless,
regulation and policy must be clear and aim to require a corporate gov-
ernance regime from banks that takes into account the public interest
because of the risks that bank failures pose to the economy. In fact, as
the 2003 Dominican banking crisis demonstrated, the general public may
be directly affected by the failure of banks. Moreover, "banking policies
matter because banks influence the ability of people, rich and poor, to
improve their living standards. ''57
If the consequences of a bank failure have a broad and devastating
scope, then so must the measures installed to prevent the failures in the
future. Consequently, banking corporate governance needs to be propor-
tional to the costs of a banking crisis in order to effectively protect all of
those that can be negatively affected by bank failure.
D. THE STAKEHOLDERS
One of the main causes of bank crises is the information asymmetry
between stakeholders and the management of the bank. In this respect,
stakeholders can limit management's excessive risk-taking by monitoring
management's activities. Kern Alexander and Rahul Dhumale point out
that "there seem to be three potential groups which can monitor the man-
agement of banks: owners, market, and supervisors. ' '58 They further con-
clude that "governance mechanisms need to be enhanced to encourage
each of the potential monitoring groups to curb excessive risk taking ac-
tivities by banks."'59
Based on the above, it is therefore necessary to identify the stakehold-
ers whose interests must be protected to ensure the proper governance of
banks. The experts consulted all include different stakeholders in the list:
depositors, creditors60 , taxpayers61, employees, managers, the local com-
munity, suppliers, and customers. 62 Specifically, Macey and O'Hara con-
sider "the corporation as nothing more (or less) than a set of contractual
arrangements among the various claimants to the products and earnings
generated by the business."' 63 Thus, stakeholders can be shareholders,
creditors, managers, employees, the local community, suppliers, custom-
56. BARTH, CAPRIO & LEVINE, supra note 35, at 179.
57. Id. at 2.
58. Alexander & Dhumale, supra note 35, at 6.
59. Id. at 7.
60. See generally Alexander, UK Corporate Governance and Banking Regulation: The
Regulator's Role as Stakeholder, supra note 35, at 993.
61. Adams & Mehran, supra note 35, at 125.
62. Macey & O'Hara, supra note 35, at 92.
63. Id.
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ers, and regulators, because they all have a valid interest in the bank.64
Owners of the bank, or the shareholders, are traditionally the parties
most interested in making certain that the bank does well; consequently,
they will monitor management in order to ensure they gain a return on
their investment. "Investors or owners who own equity in a bank in prin-
ciple have both the ability and the incentive to monitor the actions of
their bank. '65 In fact, the OECD recognizes the importance of share-
holders as effective stakeholders to manage the agency problem, devoting
the entire second section of its Principles of Corporate Governance to
"The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions". 66 It recom-
mends shareholders' "participation in key corporate governance deci-
sions, such as the nomination and election of board members" as an
element of sound corporate governance practice.67
Moreover, the OECD recognizes the existence of other stakeholders,
establishing that their rights may be contained contractually or in the law,
such as "labour, business, commercial and insolvency laws." 68 Thus,
stakeholders can be identified as all those entities having a contractual
relationship with the bank, as well as all those identified as such by the
law. The OECD clarifies that "[elven in areas where stakeholder inter-
ests are not legislated, many firms make additional commitments to
stakeholders, and concern over corporate reputation and corporate per-
formance often requires the recognition of broader interests. '69 In addi-
tion, "market participants who enter into creditor relationships with
banks could serve as monitors. '70
For their part, Macey and O'Hara propose that directors "expand the
scope of their fiduciary duties beyond shareholders to include credi-
tors."'71 They specifically "call on bank directors to take solvency risk
explicitly and systematically into account when making decisions, or else
face personal liability. ' 72 Based on "this approach, depositors and other
creditors could sue the board of directors for breach of fiduciary duties
and the standard of care, in addition to whatever contractual claims they
may have."' 73 Alexander contends that this extension of responsibility for
the board is especially important in the valuation of the bank's solvency
risk, because control will "protect the broader economy from excessive
risk-taking" 74 and opportunistic bank management, 75 which are both in
64. Id.
65. Alexander & Dhumale, supra note 35, at 9.
66. OECD, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 32 (2004), available at http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf.
67. Id. at 18.
68. Id. at 46.
69. Id.
70. Alexander & Dhumale, supra note 35, at 10.
71. Macey & O'Hara, supra note 35, at 92.
72. Id.
73. Alexander, UK Corporate Governance and Banking Regulation: The Regulator's
Role as Stakeholder, supra note 35, at 993.
74. Id.
75. Arun & Turner, supra note 35, at 372.
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the interest of all stakeholders.
But there are legal issues to attend to if fiduciary duties are to be ex-
panded formally to other stakeholder groups. This implies that directors
could face personal liability suits from stakeholders other than sharehold-
ers. This increased liability could provoke the opposite effect and the
management will become risk adverse, which would also be detrimental
to the bank.
E. THE REGULATOR
In the banking sector the regulator has "a more active role in establish-
ing standards and rules to make management practices in banks more
accountable and efficient."'76 This role usually translates into the estab-
lishment of "additional responsibilities on bank boards that often result
in detailed regulations regarding their decision-making practices and stra-
tegic aims."'77 In fact, the regulators are to be considered among the
claimants "in their roles as insurers of deposits and lenders of last resort
and in their capacity as agents of other claimants. '78 Consequently, it is
clear that the regulator is a stakeholder with respect to financial
intermediaries.
Thus, the regulator is both the architect of policies and the representa-
tive of the collection of stakeholders. For this, the regulator needs to
create policies that strengthen the market by providing stakeholders with
sufficient data to balance the information asymmetries that exist between
the banks and all of its stakeholders. 79 At the same time, the regulator
needs "to be entrusted with discretion to represent broader stakeholder
interests in order to ensure that banks operate under good governance
standards."80
But critics argue that regulators would not be suitable in this powerful
position due to the ineffective hand theory and political corruption. 81
The ineffective hand theory is based on well-intentioned governments
that take unsuccessful measures to remedy market failures. 82 The critics
also argue that governments with power to regulate and oversee the gov-
ernance of banks will pursue their own interests, such as directly financ-
ing government expenditures and extracting funds to ensure their
political power. 83 Nevertheless, the regulator is the entity that can most
efficiently handle the representation of the weak stakeholders. 84
76. Alexander, Corporate Governance and Banking Regulation: The Regulator as
Stakeholder, supra note 3, at 3.
77. Id.
78. Macey & O'Hara, supra note 35, at 92.
79. BARTH, CAPRIO & LEVINE, supra note 35, at 11.
80. Alexander, Corporate Governance and Banking Regulation: The Regulator as
Stakeholder, supra note 3, at 2.
81. BARTH, CAPRIO & LEVINE, supra note 35, at 33.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 41.
84. Alexander, Corporate Governance and Banking Regulation: The Regulator as
Stakeholder, supra note 3, at 3.
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Moreover, based on the fact that all of the stakeholder interests need
to be balanced and attended to, this responsibility falls on the board of
directors of the different financial intermediaries. So, "[t]he role of the
board of directors therefore becomes crucial in balancing the interests of
shareholders and other stakeholders (eg., creditors and depositors). 85
Therefore, to control the board's "decision-making practices and strategic
aims" the regulator will need to establish the appropriate policies.86 No
other institution has the ability to effectively represent the interests of all
the stakeholders in the elaboration of the proper policies, as well as to
participate in the continual governance of the banks and their overall su-
pervision. The reasons being that the government has the ability to
gather information and the strength to execute policies, and thus can ef-
fectively represent the interest of the weaker stakeholders, such as: tax-
payers, the community, creditors, and employees.
Furthermore, today most "international standards of banking regula-
tion are requiring domestic regulators to rely less on a strict application
of external standards and more on internal monitoring strategies. ' 87 This
means that the regulator will cooperate with the intermediary in order to
create standards and controls that are appropriate for that individual
bank.88
In sum, corporate governance is an issue that is of the utmost impor-
tance in the banking sector because the principal-agent problem it aims to
control is the main cause of banking crises. Furthermore, bank failures
have a direct and devastating effect on a country's social and economic
development; therefore, the corresponding regulations have to be elabo-
rated with a broad approach to include all stakeholders of the intermedi-
ary. Consequently, the regulator has to assume the representation of
some of the stakeholders in the governance of the bank in order to con-
trol the information asymmetries inherent to the relationships, and thus
the solvency risk.
The next section will examine if the Dominican corporate governance
framework takes into account the discussed elements in order to prevent
banking crises such as the one that occurred in 2003, measuring the
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IV. EVALUATION OF THE BANKING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK OF THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
The 2003 Dominican banking crisis cost the country 25 percent of its
GDP and the bailout of the failed banks de-capitalized the Central Bank.
It is difficult for a country to recuperate after such devastation, especially
for those with developing economies. As Rosa Maria Lastra points out,
"[t]hough crises are costly and difficult to resolve in developed countries,
their effects are even more severe in the developing world."8 9
But bank "failures are part of risk-taking,"90 but risk has to be used
responsibly. Thus, an effective banking corporate governance regime is
necessary for the prevention of banking crises, which implies the recogni-
tion and protection of different stakeholder groups and the participation
of the regulator as an agent for some of the weaker stakeholders.
In this respect, Alexander points out that the standards set by the Prin-
ciples of Corporate Governance produced by the OECD "have been in-
fluential in determining the shape and evolution of corporate-governance
standards in many advanced economies and developing countries," espe-
cially in "establishing internal control systems and risk-management
frameworks for banks and financial institutions." 91 Additionally, the
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance contain entire sections on
the rights of shareholders and stakeholders, which is consistent with the
broad approach to corporate governance. For this reason, the forthcom-
ing sections will compare and contrast the existing legislation on banking
corporate governance in the Dominican Republic with the international
corporate governance standards set by the OECD.
The first international organization to highlight the importance of cor-
porate governance was the OECD with its Principles of Corporate Gov-
ernance in 1999 and the latest revision in 2004. The weight of these
principles is demonstrated by the fact that they are the standards upheld
by the Financial Stability Forum, the World Bank, and the IMF in the
evaluation of the corporate governance practices in those entities' mem-
ber states. 92
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance are divided into six
sections, which will be used to evaluate the current Dominican corporate
governance framework.
A. ENSURING THE BASIS FOR AN EFFECTIVE
GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK
The first section of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance es-
tablishes the need for a governance framework that promotes trans-
89. Lastra, supra note 19, at 84.
90. Id. at 82.
91. Alexander, UK Corporate Governance and Banking Regulation: The Regulator's
Role as Stakeholder, supra note 35, at 1017.
92. OECD, supra note 66, at 3.
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parency and efficiency based on a clear division of responsibility among
the supervisors, the regulators, and those in charge of enforcing the re-
gime.93 The Principles also recognize the need to create incentives for
the market participants in order to ensure economic performance, 94
which is also recognition of the importance of considering the general
public in the governance of corporations.
The banking corporate governance regime in the Dominican Republic
is contained in the Commercial Code, the Monetary and Financial Law
(Law 183-02), and the corresponding resolutions of the Monetary Board
and the Superintendence of Banks.95 Law 183-02 governs the monetary
and financial system with the purpose of maintaining price stability and
overseeing that the financial intermediaries comply with the rules of fair
competition in the market.96
In charge of carrying out these objectives are: the Monetary Board, the
Superintendence of Banks, and the Central Bank. These entities are also
responsible for protecting the users of the bank facilities as well as main-
taining the stability of the financial and banking sector. The Monetary
Board is "the highest body of the Monetary and Financial Administra-
tion, ' '97 and it approves or does not approve the establishment of any
financial intermediary.98 The Superintendence of Banks is in charge of
the supervision of the intermediaries in order to ensure that they comply
with the legal instruments in force, especially concerning the reserves for
risk management. The Superintendence of Banks also lends assistance to
the Monetary Board in the granting of operation permits and issues
guidelines and sanctions for which it must have the approval of the Mon-
etary Board.99 Lastly, the Central Bank has the responsibility of super-
vising all of the operations of the financial intermediaries, as well as to
operate as lender of last resort. 1°° Additionally, the Central Bank has the
authority to sanction these regulated entities in the event of non-compli-
ance with the legal reserves standards or failure to provide the necessary
information to supervisors.' 0 '
The OECD Principles focus on a framework that enables the authori-
ties to clearly carry out their responsibilities in favor of the public inter-
est.102 In this respect, the work carried out by the Superintendence of
93. Id. at 17.
94. Id.
95. It is important to highlight that Law 183-02 was not in force during the evolution
and materialization of most of the causes of the 2003 banking crisis, as it entered
into force on December 3, 2002. Ley Monetaria y Financiera, Ley No. 183-02,
(2002) (Dom. Rep.).
96. PELLERANO & HERRERA ATTORNEYS AT LAW, MONETARY AND FINANCIAL LAW
OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 1 (2003), available at http://www.phlaw.com/pubs/
rejec/en/renMonetary and FinancialLaw of theDominicanRepublic.pdf.
97. Id. at 4.
98. Ley No. 183-02 at art. 9(f) (translated by the author).
99. PELLERANO & HERRERA, supra note 96, at 8.
100. Ley No. 183-02 at arts. 27(b), 33.
101. PELLERANO & HERRERA, supra note 98, at 6.
102. OECD, supra note 66, at 17.
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Banks and the Central Bank over the financial intermediaries is purely as
a supervisor. The law does not contemplate their collaboration with
these entities in the development of efficient internal controls or risk
management plans, in order to ensure that it does serve the public inter-
est. Therefore, it can be concluded that according to the Dominican re-
gime, the authorities are not part of the stakeholder group and are not
agents of stakeholders. Consequently, the quality of protection that will
be provided to the stakeholders that rely on the regulator will depend
strictly on their supervisory abilities. But there are three exceptions in
Law 183-02 where the authorities have hands-on responsibilities: (1)
when it approves or does not approve potential financial intermediaries;
(2) when the entity enters in the regularization process; and (3) during
the dissolution procedure contained in the law. 103
Based on the above, it is important to highlight that the International
Panel of Experts that examined the Dominican banking crises recom-
mended the designation of a responsible authority to work individually
with each financial intermediary or group.104 This way they will be able
to effectively cooperate with the bank's board in establishing and imple-
menting effective internal controls that take into account the various
stakeholders' interests.
Furthermore, the Basel Committee, an authority in the international
financial and monetary sector, has recognized the importance of corpo-
rate governance for banks by designating a working group on the issue.
In this respect, the former chairman of the Committee states that
"[b]anking supervisors have long recognised the importance of good gov-
ernance; supervision can not function properly if sound corporate govern-
ance is not in place."t05
Ideally, a proper framework should ensure accountability among the
various interested parties. So in this scenario, the Monetary Board, the
Superintendence of Banks, and the Central Bank, would be the regula-
tory entities called to represent the broad scope of stakeholders in order
to ensure that the information asymmetries between them are lessened
and the principal-agent problem is avoided. But if the responsibilities of
those entities are not clearly defined and carried out efficiently, the pub-
lic interests that depend on them will surely suffer and can provoke the
information asymmetries that cause the agency problem.
Nevertheless, the International Panel highlights that the lack of con-
trol, consistency, and inexistence of communication between the Superin-
tendence of Banks and the Central Bank led to the spending of more
103. See generally Ley No. 183-02 at arts. 37, 59-64.
104.. GUZMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 38.
105. Jaime Caruana, Chairman, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Speech at the
Second Islamic Financial Services Board Summit 2005: The Rise and Effectiveness
of Corporate Governance in the Islamic Financial Services Industry 2 (May 24,
2005), available at http://www.bis.org/review/r050525a.pdf#search=%22Jaime%20
Caruana%20Basel%2011%20and%2oCorporate%20Governance%201ssues%22.
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money in the alleged rescue.10 6 In turn, the evident lack of cooperation
between the regulators ended up costing the taxpayers more money. This
situation contradicts Ruth De Krivoy, former president of the Venezue-
lan Central Bank, as cited by Lastra, who believes that crisis management
has to consider "how the cost of crisis is to be shared between sharehold-
ers, depositors, and taxpayers. °10 7 This approach is consistent with the
broad view that is necessary in banking corporate governance.
B. RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS AND KEY OWNERSHIP FUNCTIONS
In order to ensure effective corporate governance within a company,
the OECD establishes the need to protect the rights of shareholders, as
well as their participation in the company. With this purpose, section two
of the Principles of Corporate Governance states that the corporate gov-
ernance structure should provide a secure method of ownership, availa-
bility of information regarding the corporation on a timely and regular
basis, participation in general shareholder meetings, the power to elect
and remove board members, and the right to share in the profits of the
corporation.10 8 The OECD especially emphasizes the importance of
shareholder participation in the governance of the corporation,10 9 as a
means of mitigating the principal-agent problem.
In order to establish any financial intermediary in the Dominican Re-
public, the bank first needs to be incorporated as a stock company with a
minimum of seven shareholders in accordance with the rules of the Do-
minican Commercial Code.110 The shareholders, in turn, select the mem-
bers of the board of directors and company commissaries."1 Moreover,
as banks are no ordinary corporation, Law 183-02 establishes certain re-
quirements or prohibitions in order to ensure that shareholders are quali-
fied to participate in financial intermediaries. 112
Furthermore, one of the rights of the shareholders granted by the Do-
minican Commercial Code is to elect the board of directors of the bank,
which is required to have a minimum of five natural persons, who will
have the authority to administrate and represent the entity. The mem-
bers of the board cannot fall into the prohibitions that are also applied to
shareholders. 113
Moreover, with respect to the issue of the methods of ownership and
the transfer of shares, Law 183-02 states that the transfer of shares or any
type of fusion, absorption, convergence, segregation, excision, or sale of
more than 30 percent of the paid-in-capital transfers of total or part of the
assets or debt of the financial intermediary will require the favorable
106. GUZMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 28.
107. Lastra, supra note 19, at 83.
108. OECD, supra note 66, at 18-19.
109. Id.
110. CODIGO DE COMERCIO [COD. COM.] art. 56 (Dom. Rep.).
111. Id. at art. 57.
112. Ley No. 183-02 at art. 38(f).
113. Id. at arts. 38(c), (f).
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opinion of the Superintendence of Banks and approval of the Monetary
Board, but, are in principle allowed.' 14 Thus, the regulator monitors and
approves both directors and shareholders of intermediaries as a safeguard
of the public interest, ensuring that capable persons assume these roles.
Additionally, one of the ingredients for effective corporate governance
is a timely informed shareholder as a means to control the information
asymmetries that cause the principal-agent problem between sharehold-
ers and management. In this respect, the Dominican Commercial Code,
as supplementary legal instrument, establishes that there has to be a gen-
eral shareholders meeting at least once a year. The first shareholders'
meeting has the purpose of verifying the proportioned funds, electing the
first administrators or directors of the company, and confirming the dec-
larations of the founders of the company. 1 5 In fact, every shareholder
has the right to participate and vote in accordance with the shares each of
them owns, but only half of the social capital must be represented. For
the rest of the shareholders meetings, the bylaws have to establish the
amounts of shares that need to be represented in order to validly deliber-
ate; but the Dominican Commercial Code requires a minimum of one
fourth or half of the social capital to be represented, depending on the
topics that will be addressed in the meeting.116 In these meetings the
commissaries and directors will present a report of the company's balance
and accounts, 1 7 fulfilling in part the right of shareholders to be informed
of the company's operations.
In addition to the yearly shareholders meeting, the commissaries will
always have access to the company books where they can verify its opera-
tions and, in case of urgency, can call an emergency meeting. Moreover,
the shareholders will have access to a summary statement of the com-
pany's assets and debt, which will be prepared every six months. 118
Under this regime, shareholders do have access to the information re-
garding the company's operations and health, which in turn is analyzed
by commissaries designated by them. This ensures that they have timely
information that will enable them to represent their interest to the board.
Furthermore, this section of the OECD Principles encourages share-
holders to participate, especially with respect to "key corporate govern-
ance decisions" such as the selection of the board members and their
remuneration policy.1 1 9 But in the Dominican framework, the remunera-
tion policies of the corporate entity are to be stipulated by the company
bylaws, as the law does not specifically regulate these policies. Neverthe-
less, the audits and inventories are to be available for shareholders fifteen
days prior to the general shareholders meeting along with the commissa-
114. Id. at arts. 35(a), 38(e).
115. COD. CoM. at art. 57.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at arts. 57-58.
119. OECD, supra note 66, at 34.
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ries' report.120
With respect to dividends, article 7 of the Monetary Board's Resolution
dated June 24, 2004, establishes that dividends must be the consequence
of the operation of the banks.121 Nevertheless, article 35(b) of Law 183-
02 establishes that the Monetary Board can limit the distribution of divi-
dends to allow the bank to grow when it has only recently been incorpo-
rated, but only for a maximum of five years.' 2 2 Through this mechanism
the regulator can provide security to those stakeholders that depend on
the evolution and growth of the company, such as employees, depositors,
and creditors. The reason for this protection is to control shareholders'
desire for excessive returns on their investment.
Moreover, article 38 of the same law states that the Monetary Board
has to approve any issuance of preferred shares and its characteristics. 123
But they may never authorize the right to perceive anticipated dividends
not generated by the operation of the bank. In fact, the law clarifies that
the payment of dividends will be subject to requisites established by the
monetary and financial authorities through specific regulations. The reg-
ulator acts as an agent of some of the stakeholders by establishing and
controlling the flow of dividends to the hands of shareholders, which in
turn mitigates the possibility of the agency problem in the relationships
that other stakeholders may have with shareholders.
C. EQUITABLE TREATMENT OF SHAREHOLDERS
The third section of the OECD Principles focuses on the protection of
minority shareholders, calling for the equitable treatment of all share-
holders including foreign shareholders.1 24 In fact,
[i]n jurisdictions where the enforcement of the legal and regulatory
framework is weak, some countries have found it desirable to
strengthen the ex-ante rights of shareholders such as by low share
ownership thresholds for placing items on the agenda of the share-
holders meeting or by requiring a supermajority of shareholders for
certain important decisions. 125
In the Dominican Republic, the law requires a minimum of one half of
the social capital to be present when the meeting will deliberate on any of
the following issues: (1) modification of the company bylaws; (2) the con-
tinuation of the company for more time than it was established; (3) disso-
lution of the company before the established time; and (4) incorporation
of additional capital from special reserves. 126 The rest of the sharehold-
120. COD. COM. at art. 58.
121. Administraci6n Monetaria y Financiera Junta Monetaria, Reglamento Para la
Apertura y Funcionamiento de Entidades de Intermediaci6n Financiera y Oficinas
de Representaci6n art. 7, de 11 de mayo de 2004 (Dom. Rep.).
122. Ley No. 183-02 at art. 35(b).
123. Id. at art. 38.
124. OECD, supra note 66, at 20.
125. Id. at 40.
126. COD. COM. at art. 57.
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ers meetings require a minimum of one fourth of the social capital to be
represented. 127 Evidently, other issues of corporate governance, such as
the remuneration of the board members, are not included, which is a defi-
ciency in the law.
Furthermore, the Dominican Commercial Code establishes that the
number of shares required to attend the shareholders' meeting will be
determined by the company bylaws. But these limitations can only be
agreed to when they affect all shares in the same way.' 28 In fact, Law
183-02 establishes limitations to this rule specifically for financial in-
termediaries. First, there may not be any pacts or stipulations in the com-
pany bylaws that can be considered abusive to minority shareholders or
that contain excessive limitations to the decision making process. 129 Sec-
ondly, the bylaws cannot request more than .01 percent of the social capi-
tal as a condition to attend shareholders meetings.' 30
In addition to the above, this section also prohibits insider trading and
abusive self-dealing, and instructs that all shareholders must disclose if
"they directly, indirectly or on behalf of third parties, have a material
interest in any transaction or matter directly affecting the corpora-
tion. '131 Insider trading is the "manipulation of the capital markets," and
"is prohibited by securities regulations, company law and/or criminal law
in most OECD countries."'1 32 Moreover, "self-dealing occurs when per-
sons having close relationships to the company, including controlling
shareholders, exploit those relationships to the detriment of the company
and investors. '133 The OECD explains that "[t]hese practices can be seen
as constituting a breach of good corporate governance inasmuch as they
violate the principle of equitable treatment of shareholders.' 34 This sec-
tion highlights the possibility of information asymmetries amongst share-
holders, and the importance of disclosure as a tool that provides the
information for the different shareholders to protect themselves from
each other.
On this issue, article 45 of Law 183-02 expressly prohibits the following
activities:
To grant financing for subscription of shares, payment of fines, and
any other type of securities issued by related entities of the Financial
Institution; [and]
To grant or transfer through bonds, goods, loans or securities of the
institution to its shareholders, officers, and employees or to related
individuals, or to enterprises or Institutions controlled by these per-
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Ley No. 183-02 at art. 37(c).
130. Id. at art. 38(c).
131. OECD, supra note 66, at 45.
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sons, under conditions lower than those prevailing in the market. 135
Moreover, article 47 of the same law prohibits the allowance of credits
directly or indirectly to shareholders, administrators, directors, execu-
tives, and employees, including their spouses, family, and related compa-
nies, for more than 50 percent of the bank's technical patrimony. 136
Nevertheless, there are some exceptions established expressly by the law.
Additionally, non-compliance with this provision is subject to monetary
sanction by the authorities. 137
Thus, the adequate participation of shareholders in corporate govern-
ance issues enables them to be well informed of what is going on in the
company, which in turn reduces the risk of any individual shareholder
manipulating company policy for personal advantage. After extensive re-
search in various jurisdictions, Gerard Caprio, Luc Laeven, and Ross Le-
vine have concluded that "weak shareholder protection laws" lower bank
valuations,138 because part of shareholder protection is the right to be
informed of the company's activities, which in turn allows them to protect
their investment from other stakes in the company. Furthermore, bank
valuations are an indirect indication of the market perception of the
bank's corporate governance. 139
D. ROLE OF STAKEHOLDERS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
An effective corporate governance framework needs to "recognise the
rights of stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements
and encourage active co-operation between corporations and stakehold-
ers in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound
enterprises.' 140 Therefore, corporate governance should take into ac-
count the general public interest when elaborating regulation, as well as
when implementing governance structures.
The OECD Principles recommend that stakeholders are kept informed
of the company's governance, promoting "[p]erformance-enhancing
mechanisms for employee participation," 141 as well as protection for all
employees and stakeholders that wish to voice their opinions or concerns
regarding "illegal or unethical practices," without compromising their
rights, 142 and "foster wealth-creating co-operation among stakehold-
ers. ' 143 Moreover, the Basel Committee establishes that:
135. PELLERANO & HERRERA, supra note 96, at 20.
136. Ley No. 183-02 at art. 47.
137. Id. at arts. 47, 67(a).
138. Gerard Caprio, Luc Laeven & Ross Levine, Governance and Bank Valuation 2
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10158, 2003), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10158.pdf.
139. BARTH, CAPRIO & LEVINE, supra note 35, at 247.
140. OECD, supra note 66, at 21.
141. Id. at 47.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 46.
DOMINICAN BANKING CRISIS
[f]rom a banking industry perspective, corporate governance in-
volves the manner in which the business and affairs of banks are gov-
erned by their boards of directors and senior management, which
affects how they: [s]et corporate objectives; [o]perate the bank's bus-
iness on a day-to-day basis; [m]eet the obligation of accountability to
their shareholders and take into account the interests of other
recognised stakeholders; [ajlign corporate activities and behavior
with the expectation that banks will operate in a safe and sound
manner, and in compliance with applicable laws and regulations; and
[p]rotect the interests of depositors.14 4
In fact, the Basel Committee's working group on corporate governance
clarifies that "[s]upervisors, governments and depositors are among the
stakeholders due to the unique role of banks in national and local econo-
mies and financial systems, and the associated implicit or explicit deposit
guarantees. '145 The Committee recognizes the specialty of the bank cor-
poration and elevates the role of the supervisor, government, and the de-
positors to stakeholders.
In the Dominican system, Law 183-02 establishes that the regulation of
the financial system will have the objective of protecting the competitive-
ness, efficiency, and free market for which it will require all financial in-
termediaries to comply with the mandatory liquidity, solvency, and
governance conditions. 146
Moreover, the law establishes that it is a serious infraction to not fulfill
the duty of providing shareholders, depositors, and other creditors of the
entity with information regarding liquidity or solvency problems. 147 Also,
the regulator is entitled to information as a supervisor of the entity, and
the failure to comply is considered a very serious infraction. 148
Law 183-02 also contains rules concerning the information that should
be given to the public and establishes a minimum time to schedule for
customer service. Compliance with the rules is monitored by the Super-
intendence of Banks. 149 Moreover, the law requires that each financial
intermediary publish its financial statements, interest rates, expenses, and
commissions, as well as its exchange rate, stating that it is prohibited to
charge for expenses not expressly agreed to by the parties and disallows
verbal agreements. 150
Furthermore, one of the protections granted to the broad base of
stakeholders is the requirement of prior authorization for operation and
establishment of any financial intermediary. As explained before, this
authorization is given by the Monetary Board based on the fulfillment of
144. BASEL COMMITIEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, ENHANCING CORPORATE Gov-
ERNANCE FOR BANKING ORGANISATIONS 4 (2006), available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/bcbs122.pdf.
145. Id. at 4 n.7.
146. Ley No. 183-02 at art. 2(b).
147. Id. at art. 68(b)(1).
148. Id. at art. 68(a).
149. Id. at art. 52(a).
150. Id. at art. 52(b).
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certain requirements established by law or regulation. 151 Through this
process the regulator ensures that the financial services that will be avail-
able to the public are secure and legal. This screening procedure is one of
the few examples of how the regulator can act as a representative of
stakeholders. The Monetary Board verifies the capital adequacy of the
potential bank; the capacity of the founding shareholders, directors, and
executives; that there are no abusive agreements in the bylaws that would
violate the rights of minority shareholders or control the decision making
process; and that all other requirements have been fulfilled.152
Moreover, the OECD Principles state that in the event of insolvency of
the financial intermediary, "[e]specially in emerging markets, creditors
are a key stakeholder and the terms, volume and type of credit extended
to firms will depend importantly on their rights and on their enforceabil-
ity. ' '153 In fact, "[i]n some countries, when companies are nearing insol-
vency, the legislative framework imposes a duty on directors to act in the
interests of creditors, who might therefore play a prominent role in the
governance of the company. '154 It can be interpreted that the Dominican
system adopts a similar approach for the regularization and the dissolu-
tion processes for intermediaries.
On this issue, the law establishes that when creditors' investments are
in danger for any of the reasons expressly stipulated in the law, the regu-
larization process can be initiated by the Superintendence of Banks, as
well as by the bank itself.155 The authorities will monitor the regulariza-
tion plan and the bank's compliance with it.156
Another example of the regulator's role as stakeholder is in the event
of dissolution of the bank. In this case, the Superintendence of Banks
will register the working liabilities, except for the directors' "in order to
proceed with the exclusion of assets and deposits in accordance with the
regulation established thereon,"1 57 thus protecting the workers of the in-
termediary who are important stakeholders of the same.
In detail, the first order obligations established by the Monetary and
Financial Law are:
a) Private sector's current-account, on-demand, savings and time de-
posits, excluding operations with other financial intermediaries and
tied deposits;
b) Cash orders, including foreign trade pre-payments, collections,
and tax withholdings, drafts, transfers through contracts;
c) Judicial deposits;
d) Labor liabilities; and
e) The price owed for the technical assistance that may be hired by
the Banking Superintendency charged to the dissolving entity, to ex-
151. See id. at art. 5.
152. Id. at art. 37.
153. OECD, supra note 66, at 48.
154. Id.
155. Ley No. 183-02 at arts. 60, 61.
156. Id.
157. PELLERANO & HERRERA, supra note 96, at 24.
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clude privileged obligations. 158
In addition, the second order obligations cited by the law are: "a) Pub-
lic sector's current-account, on demand, savings and time deposits; b) Ob-
ligations with the Central Bank; c) Obligations with financial brokerage
institutions; [and] d) Tax liabilities of the dissolving entity." 159
The first order obligations will be transferred to one or more solvent
financial intermediaries in the market through a securitization process
"that would make these assets into a non attachable, autonomous capital,
subject to the service of the profit-sharing emitted. ' 160 The transfers
made by the Superintendence, in any of its forms, do not require the con-
sent of any of the debtors, creditors or any other claimants, 161 thus the
Superintendence acts as the legal agent of those entities. Finally, the
residual balance will be available to satisfy the credit of the workers that
was not transferred during the dissolution process, and then other privi-
leged obligations. 162 Moreover, the depositors will have access to the re-
serve at the Central Bank; their deposits will be fulfilled up to the cap of
five hundred thousand Dominican pesos, per person, or 30 percent of the
privileged obligations. 163
Additionally, the law states that the voluntary dissolution of the bank
will only proceed after the intermediary has proven that it has returned
all of the deposits and debt due, and after the approval of the Superinten-
dence of Banks and the Monetary Board. 164 In sum, the dissolution pro-
cess of banks does take into account various stakeholder interests, with
shareholders bearing most of the losses and the other stakeholders repre-
sented by an active regulator.
E. DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY
In addition to the above principles, the corporate governance frame-
work needs to ensure the timely and accurate disclosure of all material
information regarding the corporation, in particular, information on the
financial, governance ownership, and performance of the entity. 165 The
OECD Principles emphasize that "[a] strong disclosure regime that pro-
motes real transparency is a pivotal feature of market-based monitoring
of companies and is central to shareholders' ability to exercise their own-
ership rights on an informed basis."'1 66
Thus, disclosure and transparency are means for stakeholders to exer-
cise their rights in order to balance the agency problem, and as such, are




161. Ley No. 183-02 at art. 63(i).
162. Id. at art. 630).
163. Id. at art. 64(c).
164. Id. at art. 65(b).
165. OECD, supra note 66, at 22.
166. Id. at 49.
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only as effective as what is done with the information they provide, and
that rests in the hands of stakeholders.
Based on the need to inform stakeholders, the OECD Principles high-
light the need for both external and internal annual audits, specifying that
the external auditors are accountable to the shareholders and the com-
pany.167 The work of auditors informs management, shareholders, and
stakeholders of the real situation of the company, and in effect, will en-
able proper market monitoring of the banks because it will balance the
information asymmetries at the heart of the agency problem and banking
crises.
Furthermore, pillar three of the new Basel accord "also addresses cor-
porate governance concerns by focusing on transparency and market-dis-
cipline mechanisms to improve the flow of information between bank
management and investors," and align their objectives. 168 It "contains
the first detailed framework of rules and standards that supervisors can
apply to the practices of senior management and the board for banking
groups. '1 69 Disclosure is key to informed stakeholders that would effec-
tively represent their interests and control the risks that the agency prob-
lem entails. Moreover, the working group on corporate governance of
the Basel Committee considers transparency and disclosure to be the me-
diums to effectively inform stakeholders of the real situation of the bank
and ensure protection of their interests. 170
In the Dominican system, Law 183-02 establishes general requirements
for internal controls, such as "Up-to-date Administrative Policies"' 17 1 and
internal manuals and procedures, in order to coherently evaluate credit-
worthiness and comply with rules governing anti-money laundering and
other illicit-activities. 172 Additionally, the law establishes that in-
termediaries must implement processes that efficiently and accurately
measure and manage risk, 73 and other internal controls that clearly de-
fine the responsibilities and proper ethics of those who work in the
entity.'7 4
Section V of title III of the Dominican Monetary and Financial Law is
titled "Of Financial Transparency." 175 It states that banks must disclose
the investments they may make in other entities and related services.1 76
The Superintendence of Banks will keep a register of these activities.' 77
Moreover, all financial intermediaries have the obligation of docu-
167. Id. at 22.
168. Alexander, UK Corporate Governance and Banking Regulation: The Regulator's
Role as Stakeholder, supra note 35, at 1016.
169. Id. at 1014.
170. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 144, at 15.
171. PELLERANO & HERRERA, supra note 96, at 17.
172. Ley No. 183-02 at art. 55(a).
173. Id. at art. 55(b).
174. Id. at art. 55(c).
175. Id. at art. 51 (translated by the author).
176. Id.
177. Id. at art. 41(a).
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menting their operations in a regulated form and are to keep them for a
minimum of ten years after the cancellation of the operation. 178 The law
further establishes some minimum information that will have to be dis-
closed regarding credits and loans. 179 Furthermore, the Superintendence
of Banks will establish a system of risk information that will require the
mandatory participation of all the regulated entities. 180 They will provide
information regarding their debtors, classifying them in a homogenous
manner in order to create the database. 181
The law also requires that the financial intermediaries publish their fi-
nancial statements, and in a visible form, display the offered interest rate,
the annual calculations of expenses and commissions that apply to the
different operations conducted by the bank, the offered exchange rate,
and the price of all services they offer to the public, 82 in order to protect
the intermediaries' customers. Nevertheless, it does not contain special
stipulations regarding the information that should be made available for
employees as recommended by the OECD.1 83
F. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BOARD
The sixth section of the OECD Principles refers to the board of direc-
tors, stating that "[t]he corporate governance framework should ensure
the strategic guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of man-
agement by the board, and the board's accountability to the company and
the shareholders.'1 84 "[T]he board is chiefly responsible for monitoring
managerial performance and achieving an adequate return for sharehold-
ers, while preventing conflicts of interest and balancing competing de-
mands on the corporation. '185
For this reason, the board is the corporation's nerve center where all
stakeholders' interests meet and are directed to control management
from excessive risk taking. Thus, "boards are expected to take due re-
gard of, and deal fairly with, other stakeholder interests including those
of employees, creditors, customers, suppliers and local communities.1 l86
As previously addressed, these principles are consistent with the recom-
mendations made by the Basel Committee's working group on their con-
sultative document on corporate governance. In fact, the purpose of the
consultative document is "describing the roles of the board of directors
and senior management in managing risk and underscoring the need for
banks to set strategies for their operations and establish accountability
178. Id. at art. 51.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at arts. 56(a)-(b).
182. Id. at art. 53.
183. See OECD, supra note 66, at 53.
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for executing these strategies."'187
Because of the importance of the board of directors to the corporation,
it is logical that the persons elected as members of the board must fulfill
the minimum threshold standards established by law. 188 These require-
ments prohibit the following persons from becoming members of the
board: anyone who happens to work for the government administration;
anyone who has been a director or administrator of a financial brokerage
entity that had its operation permit revoked, been sanctioned, or rescued;
or persons that are insolvent or have been convicted of financial
crimes.189 As such, these requirements are consistent with the interna-
tional standards that mandate that the shareholders and managers' be fit
and proper to carry out their duties and responsibilities in the company.
In fact, the law expressly requires that at least 40 percent of the members
of the board of directors be professionals with experience in the financial
sector, or persons with accredited economic, financial, or entrepreneurial
experience. 190
But Law 183-02 fails in that it does not outline or enumerate specific
responsibilities to the board of directors, or hold them to a specific stan-
dard of conduct. Rather, the law lists express penal norms regarding the
sanctioning of directors and other company executives for breach of the
law, and/or acting in their own interest. 191 In this specific aspect, the Do-
minican system is lacking in the implementation of a specific standard
that the board of directors will be held to in order to ensure accountabil-
ity, which is essential for the protection of the stakeholders.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The 2003 bank crisis in the Dominican Republic is an example of how
costly these banking catastrophes are, especially in developing countries.
This cost makes it necessary for authorities, the markets, and all those
affected to attend to the prevention of future failures, because as stated
by Barth, Caprio, and Levine, banking policies have a direct effect on the
living standards of society.192
Therefore, it is logical to assume that the failure of a bank is much
more disastrous than that of any other corporation because banks have
more stakeholders, as they are at many times "the main depository for
the economy's savings. ' 193 This is consistent with the consequences of
the Dominican banking crisis where the losses accrued to 25 percent of
the country's GDP, becoming a heavy burden on taxpayers and society as
a whole.
187. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 144, at 2.
188. See Ley No. 183-02 at art. 38(f).
189. Id.
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191. See generally id. at arts. 66-72, 80.
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Furthermore, many of intermediary's stakeholders do not have the
means to protect their interests from excessive risk-taking by manage-
ment or are unable to do so even if provided with the proper information,
which in turn has deeper consequences than the agency problem. These
deeper consequences derive from the findings of studies that have identi-
fied the principal-agent problem as one of the main causes of recent
banking crises. 194 Therefore, controlling the agency problem should be
on the top of the list of priorities in the management of risk and preven-
tion of future bank crises.
The first step in controlling the agency problem is to recognize that
banking corporate governance is different than the governance that is to
be applied to other types of industries. The reason for this distinction is
that banks have to attend to the different stakeholder interests, including
the general public. Thus, in banks there is no single agency problem, but
rather a wide range of relationship problems that can take place. These
include shareholders, creditors, taxpayers, claimants, managers, employ-
ees, suppliers, customers, and the regulator in representation of the pub-
lic interest. The regulator plays a dual role as the developer of policies
and agent of the public interest, and as such, must be considered a stake-
holder and be vested with the authority to cooperate with banks' boards
of directors in order to develop the adequate mechanisms to control man-
agement's risk taking. This is consistent with the cited experts, as well as
the OECD and the Basel Committee standards.
After the crisis in 2003, it is in the interest of the Dominican Republic
to ensure that it has the adequate mechanisms to prevent future bank
crises. A corporate governance system that takes into account the inter-
ests of stakeholders is the first step in that direction. In this respect, the
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance are highly regarded as very
influential in shaping today's corporate governance standards, 195 and as
such, are an effective measurement for the existing banking corporate
governance framework in the Dominican Republic.
The Dominican monetary and financial regime describes the existence
of three authoritative entities, all with supervisory power over financial
intermediaries. Therefore, if the regulator is a stakeholder of banks, then
in the Dominican system it may only express its interests through supervi-
sion. It does not work with the entity to develop adequate internal con-
trols, except during the approval of the entity for operation when it
revises the submitted documents, during the regularization process as
monitor, and during the dissolution of the intermediary. In this respect,
the recommendation made by the International Panel of Experts to des-
ignate a responsible authority to work individually with each financial
intermediary,1 96 is to be highly regarded. But it will only be as effective
194. Alexander & Dhumale, supra note 35, at 6.
195. Alexander, UK Corporate Governance and Banking Regulation: The Regulator's
Role as Stakeholder, supra note 35, at 1017.
196. GUZMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 38.
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as the political independence exercised by the regulator and the sound-
ness of the general political environment. 197
Moreover, on the issue of the rights of shareholders and other stake-
holders, the Dominican framework does include provisions for the pro-
tection of their interests. The right for shareholders to be continually
informed of the company is contained in the Dominican Commercial
Code, while Law 183-02 protects minority shareholders from not being
allowed to participate in shareholder meetings. Nevertheless, a possible
reform could include the participation of shareholders in the develop-
ment and application of the remuneration policies for directors and exec-
utives, in order to limit the information asymmetries on this respect, as
well as specific ways through which shareholders can hold the board ac-
countable for their actions.
Furthermore, the law also includes depositors and other creditors as
stakeholders entitled to receive information on the bank's liquidity and
solvency problems, sanctioning non-compliance to this obligation. Addi-
tionally, Law 183-02 contains rules on the information that needs to be
available for customers, which is consistent with the fact that informed
stakeholders are better prepared to protect their interests. Finally, the
Superintendence steps in to handle the regularization and dissolution of
the bank in protection of the public interest, defending those stakehold-
ers that are less able to exercise their rights.
In conclusion, the Dominican banking corporate governance regime
does take into account the interests of the various stakeholder groups.
But the regulator's role is one-sided, limited to the supervision of the
intermediary instead of having the power to cooperate and ensure ade-
quate internal controls and an effective representation of the public inter-
est. Moreover, specific standards with which to measure the board of
directors and its obligation to uphold the interests of the different stake-
holders must be included in future reforms of the monetary and financial
law. These additions to the role of the regulator will not eliminate risk
intrinsic to the financial market,198 but it is a step in taming it in order to
prevent the recurrence of the catastrophe of 2003.
197. See generally Viviano De Le6n, Montds Afirma Presiones desde Palacio Crearon
Crisis Bancaria, LISTIN DIARIO (Dom. Rep.), June 9, 2006, http://images.lis-
tindiario.com/ediciones/2006/06/090606/cuerpos/ciudades/ciu5.htm (remarks made
by the current technical secretary to the president regarding the lack of political
independence of the monetary and financial authorities during the last presidential
term).
198. Lastra, supra note 19, at 82.
